In the last thirty years of the past century, when the study of Indian languages was spreading in Europe, broad audiences were interested in Indian religions, most notably in Buddhism [fn. 1], which was previously known in Europe in its Chinese and Japanese forms, and which appeared in Indian literature as a more ideal and perfect phenomenon compared to the Chino–Japanese forms. This resulted in a strong Buddhist enthusiasm in Europe, culminating in a mass departure of Europeans to the East to become followers of Buddhism. Even today many Europeans can be found in Buddhist countries, most notably in Ceylon, Burma and Siam, living in local monasteries as Buddhist monks. This fact, which I myself have observed during my travel in India and Ceylon, and the fact that even in our country I very often hear people extolling the assets of Buddhism and, moreover, considering it the most perfect of religions, compelled me to touch on the issue and to do so from a purely practical standpoint. Therefore, I shall not provide a complete and detailed lecture on Buddhism, but I shall rather provide a criticism of Buddhism from the standpoint of an unprejudiced European.

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Criticism of any religion can take various directions, since religion can be observed from different angles. The most important is criticism of a religion as religion in general. Secondly, there is criticism of morality. Only then shall a philosophical foundation, a cosmological view, etc. be considered. In this essay, I want to regard Buddhism only as religion in general and as an ethical system.

Before anything else, I shall present some facts for better orientation. During the moral and social decline of India in the 6th century BC, prince Gautama Siddhartha had left the royal palace and become a wandering monk, hoping to find in asceticism a solution to the sorrowful conditions of humankind. He of course did not find it, but he discovered there a teaching that a deed (Karman) has an impact, that any living being reincarnates after its death, and that the one who suppresses any deed attains liberation from the chain of rebirths called samsara and becomes a victor (jina). On this foundation and after long pondering, Gautama, who had fainted under a fig tree, attained the principle of the new religion or, as he himself called it, the Enlightenment (bodhi), become the Buddha and, at the same time, a jina. The evil of rebirth lies, according to him, in the fact that every real existence is related to suffering, and thus it is necessary to strive to stop the chain of rebirths; it is necessary to seek the extinguishment of existence, nirvanam. In contrast, nature acts in such a way that every being clings to existence, thirsting for life. This thirst (trshna, tanha) is the result of ignorance. This is why not asceticism, but knowledge, of which enlightenment is the climax, is helpful in quenching this thirst. This is the middle way between two extremes prevailing in India in those days, i.e. between asceticism and prodigality.

This foundation has further necessary consequences, so that all crucial questions that occupied humankind were answered by the new system, and possible rivals rejected.

For my argument, it is particularly important how Buddhism developed in religious terms.

It is usually assumed that Buddhism is an atheistic movement and in a certain respect rightly so. At least “god” in the sense as we understand the meaning of the word has absolutely no place in this system. On the other hand, devas are mentioned in the Buddhist canonical writings, and this word is used in the Indian language to designate gods. To explain this discrepancy, it is above all important to consider that neither our term “god” nor the Latin deus or the Greek theos correspond to the Indian term deva. Already in Vedic religion, devas are beings only slightly more perfect than humans, so that one can by, e.g., means of strong asceticism, gain more power than them and exert influence over their will. But such a great effort is not needed: accurately uttered prayer necessarily subdues devas to humans. However, we cannot accept even this notion of god in Buddhism even though both the word and the term deva are very frequent in the oldest Buddhist literature. Many instances can be ruled out by the fact that the word is used in passages referring to either older religion or older conditions to which a reference is made; but many instances remain where the word deva appears in clear relation to Buddhism itself. It seems to me very probable that the opinion of contemporary Burmese people is correct, namely that the Buddha understands the word deva as a designation for a super-human but not a transcendental being, and even not a being necessary, but only possible, as a third link in the chain of rebirths after an animal and a human.

As a result of this athetesis of god there is an abolition of worship in Buddhism. With his system, the Buddha indeed opposes Brahmanical ritualism which is for him immoral because it is an expression of clinging to existence. Man demands something from god for his comfort through worship. In Buddhism, the authority is not god but the Buddha, i.e. the one who has attained the ultimate knowledge by complete suppression of the thirst for life and thereby eradicated the effects of former rebirths, and, as a result, his immediate destiny is the complete liberation from real existence, quenching, nirvanam. But the Buddha should not be worshipped by obeisances but should be revered, i.e. his instructions, advice, and orders should be followed so that as many people as possible may attain the bliss of nirvanam. This circumstance provides Buddhism with a strong ethical character, which is, in fact, what it is, almost exclusively.

Considering these two aspects of Buddhism – i.e. that it lacks its own god and definitely any god that could be a leading authority, and that it lacks a cult, a ritual – we can say that Buddhism is devoid of the nature of religion in our meaning of the word. We can say of Buddhism that it is religio, but not – at least in the time of its conception – a religion. [annotation 2]

There is yet another reason why Buddhism, at least as far as it remains in the intentions of its founder, is not a religion. Taking into account what has been discovered up until today about the development of religion in general, we reach an interesting finding concerning the dependency of religion on human feeling. Original primal religions depend on this feeling exclusively, and only during their degeneration new rational aspects accumulate. On the other hand, derived secondary religions originate when stimuli for religious feelings (such as awe at the grandeur of nature and the resulting feeling of dependency) are weakened, and there is a need for very artificial constructions to support and refresh these feelings. Here we reach religious philosophy and, at the same time, a need to establish morality on these religious constructions. Thus, according to older terminology, these religious movements are called ethical systems. Observing now Buddhism from the perspective of this scheme, we see that in Buddhism this philosophical–moral construction completely suppresses the original feeling aspect.

As a result, of course, a conflict between the system and a human accepting this system has emerged. The feeling aspect is always more or less developed in an individual, and in general we can say about religious feelings that they are inversely proportional to a development of rationality, even though other aspects (such as climate, race, natural conditions) play in this respect important roles. Therefore, a religion – sit venia verbo – not respecting this feeling aspect was not meant for the people but only for genii of spirit or, alternatively, should it become a popular religion, it had to step down from its high throne down below to the people subjected to feelings. [ann. 3] A fact that the second condition has occurred in Buddhism is clear at the first glance from a huge spread of Buddhism in the Asian world. Numerous sects that emerged immediately after the death of Gautama were responsible for creating this form of Buddhism. Staying perfectly on the grounds of Buddhism, the northern school worked to popularize Buddhism by focusing on the former rebirths of the Buddha, i.e. Bodhisattvas. These Bodhisattvas replaced gods and became objects of pious devotion. This devotion of Bodhisattvas has led, in some movements of the northern school, even to religious mysticism.

In contrast, the southern school retains the original condition as a whole, and in order to satisfy the needs for the feeling of the masses, it permits devotion to the old gods, i.e. gods of Hinduism in Ceylon and folk Mongol gods in Burma, Siam and China.

These changes were inevitably followed by changes in the organisation of the Buddhist church. The original adherents of Buddhism consisted of a close circle of individuals dedicated solely to the attainment of nirvana as their goal and thus lived poorly from gifts – they were beggars, bhikshu. Since there was no ritual, there were no priests among them either, thus all of them were equal and varied only by age. Apart from these bhikshus there were no Buddhists. However, this was accompanied by a great deal of exclusivity towards people, which was actually not possible, because bhikshus were dependent on working or wealthy people who provided them with food and clothing. Thus, in addition to Buddhists proper a great number of their followers appear who voluntarily keep certain rules as bhikkshus [sic] but do not fully seek the attainment of nirvana. This condition remains as long as there is no need for gods and worship. On this stage of development, bhikshus become priests who are not only mentors of people but also ritual experts. This development is accompanied by an unprecedented growth of power and privileges of bhikshus, even though it is in contradiction to the tenets of the original system. A result of this inner development of Buddhism in our times is clericalization in both north and south alike.

All these features combined have resulted in that the feeling aspect grows once again in Buddhism, and it does so with extraordinary strength. Consequently, what is today called Buddhism – especially among the people whom I would call falsely orthodox – is purely primal religion with all the primitive cults and all that, moreover, in a highly degenerated form.

The aspect of Buddhism that was just thoroughly discussed, the purely religious aspect, in its contemporary form – neither as northern nor as southern Buddhism – absolutely cannot be convenient for a person raised by European civilisation and culture. Fleeing from Christianity to contemporary orthodox Buddhism is clearly a way towards the worse. If the primary cults and rituals are in Christianity just superstition, even though they are tolerated by key clerical circles, these primary rituals are in contemporary Buddhism the most important of all aspects. I shall provide just two examples from the southern Buddhism, which is in general much closer to the original Buddhism. First of all, if Sinhalese talk about a Buddhist priest or with him, they use completely different terms than they usually do, because they believe in demons that seek how to harm Buddhist priests everywhere they go, and these demons supposedly cannot understand these usually euphemistic utterances. For example, instead of saying “the priest eats” (Hámuduuwákhawá), it is uttered “the priest makes a gift to disappear” (Hámuduruwá dana valandanawá). The second such typical example is a spirit conjuring in Buddhist temples called in Ceylon Pirit. This pirit actually consists of reading aloud prayers which are part of the Buddhist canonical writings, especially some sermons of the Buddha. But these prayers are not good enough: astrologers, conjurers, and devilish dancers must come to a monastery to perform their breakneck ceremonies, which are alone effective and absolutely necessary, to cleanse the monastery from some really dangerous demons.

On the other hand, the original form of Buddhism can be in one respect very appealing for Europeans, and many Europeans claiming to be Buddhists, such as English scholar Rhys Davids, lean toward this ideal form, which they themselves actually have derived from the canonical writings. A flaw here is – even though a subsidiary one – that we do not know whether these derived ideas correspond to the original teaching of Gautama. On the other hand, a strong objection remains: if someone wants to renounce the religious feeling aspect, would it not be better to lean toward a philosophical movement built on the same culture in which any European was raised, and which would be more convenient for him in all respects? This objection was actually raised by so–called Neobuddhists [ann. 4], who are not true Buddhists, but followers of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, which shares many similarities with the philosophical aspect of Buddhism.

Buddhism presents for modern man, raised by European standards, yet another difficulty – the imperative inactivity conditioned by the entire Buddhist theory. An organisation of beggar monks in Europe would be surely a step backwards, even though it is convenient for a handful of individuals. Even if this obstacle were overcome – for example by a departure of Buddhist–minded people into the East – the movement would remain culturally insignificant and forever limited to people, who to a certain degree, have settled their accounts with life due to social misfortunes. Truly, many people of this kind resort to Buddhist monasteries, and they can be found not only in Burma but in Ceylon as well. For this kind of people, a Buddhist monastery will be always more important than a Christian one, because it not only does not divert them from life, but it also brings them back to life; it does not even hinder them to return to their career, family, and what is called human happiness, if the conditions that had led to their renunciation of life have changed in their favour, or if they have discovered the foolishness of religious mortification.

But the fact is that even people of respectable standings are leaving Europe for the East to become Buddhist monks. The reason for the behaviour of these people lies outside of the religious idea of Buddhism, that is, in its morality. I do not want to criticize ethical conditions in Europe, but it is to be stated that on the theoretical level, morality is pushed to extremes, but the real state of, so to speak, moral behaviour does not, by any means, correspond to this condition. An outcome of these circumstances is searching and groping. And so, some people who cannot reach the insight that only the individual will can be an authority, and be the only authority for the very same individual, resort to Buddhism, where morality is formulated in absolutely practical terms: there are no extremes, but only a middle way, certain and secure, which is to be travelled firmly and straight in order to reach the goal.

Quenching the thirst for pleasure, for being, and development, the suppression of suffering which is achieved by the eightfold path – the right view, the right desire, the right speech, the right behaviour, the right life, the right effort, the right recollection, the right consideration – is at the core of Buddhist morality. In specialized particularities, this morality is contained in the ten Buddhist commandments, or rather, in the ten prohibitions, since all of them are negative and serve to highlight the reverse side of the morality. The morality is, in detail elaborated in a public confession of Buddhist monks, i.e. patimokkha, containing approximately two hundred items.

To assess Buddhist morality, it is sufficient to consider the ten Buddhist commandments and incentives leading to particular prohibitions.

The first prohibition – thou shalt not kill living beings – is based on a theory of nature, which requires that each creature be allowed the time allotted to it by cosmic circumstances for its complete development, which determines the manner of its next birth. Thus, this prohibition is common to all Indian religious creeds believing in future incarnations. But in Buddhism, this law has not been brought to its extreme. For example, in Brahmanism, Jainism, and other systems, a consequence of this view is vegetarianism. Buddhism does not make this consequence and allows even bhikshus to eat meat if they receive it as a gift and do not require it by themselves. Even a legend says that the Buddha had been eating meat, and his death was caused by eating unhealthy pork.

The second prohibition – thou shalt not steal – which agrees with all the most primitive legal opinions, is in Buddhism directed against some ascetic sects expressing communist opinions, which served to them as a basis for claiming that a beggar monk has, whenever, a right to take whatever he needs. Buddhism does not allow this and refer beggar monks to gifts alone.

The third prohibition – thou shalt not commit sexual intercourse – is distinctive for Buddhism and is common only to a few other Indian ascetic sects. In Buddhism, this prohibition is motivated by an effort to reduce the line of rebirths by reducing birth as such. The thirst for life is equal to thirst for having children, progeny. – That is why an interpretation for common Buddhist adherents grouped out of the order of bhikshus, as a prohibition of unchastity, does not correspond with the intention of the prohibition at all, and surely, even in circles of these adherents – at least in the first period – it was directed against excessive proliferation, if not against proliferation as such.

The fourth prohibition – thou shalt not lie – is the reverse side of the command of right speech. It is a demand so common in every lawful society that an absence of its occurrence, rather than its existence, would be striking. In Buddhism, this prohibition is founded on a basic idea that knowledge leads to the eradication of suffering, and, on the other hand, ignorance is the cause of suffering. The fact that a lie confronts knowledge and supports ignorance is a matter of course and does not need any long elaboration.

Distinctive for Buddhism is the fifth prohibition, which runs as follows: thou shalt not drink spirituous liquors, nor consume any intoxicating or poisonous liquids, for they cause negligence. A prohibition of this kind did not exist before Buddhism. It used to be common among ancient brahamanas not to drink spirituous liquors, but, instead, they very frequently consumed other intoxicating substances such as som, opium, and bhang (called hachich in French, an extract from a hemp called Cannabis Indica). Jainas, in particular, used bhang for ritual suicide. Buddhism stands against this, arguing that all poisons of this kind cause negligence, i.e. laziness in following the path leading to the eradication of suffering, and the associated obscuration of knowledge about the conditions of liberation. Reasons of this prohibition are thus purely internal and have nothing to do with European abstinence. It is therefore not correct to use this point of Buddhist morality as a proof for Buddhist progressiveness. The abstinence is in Buddhism only a consequence of the theory of suffering, hence a purely theological demand.

The following five prohibitions define Buddhism as an ascetic movement, and one that is purely Indian in fashion. These prohibitions are intended to delimit the middle path that Buddhist morality takes, as opposed to prodigality.

A prohibition not to eat in a forbidden time, i.e. after eleven in the morning, is nothing new in Buddhism, but it is rather a codification of a custom of brahmanas, who in their orthodox circles, observe this custom up to our times and eat only around ten in the morning.

The following three laws, prohibiting attending dances, singing, music, and theatre acts, as well as using wreaths, perfumes, and ointments, and the use of beautiful beds are largely directed against customs which have become, for Indians in certain times, deeply rooted necessities, and are still, up to this day, for most of them, more important than food and drink. We can see that these conditions were foundations of prodigality during India’s heyday not only in literature, but also in remainders of former splendour in museums and in spectacular settings of religious celebrations in our times, which are just a reflection of private splendour of Indian past.

The last prohibition – thou shalt not use money – defines Buddhism as an order of beggar monks.

Comparing the morality just described with the morality of other Indian ascetics, we have to admit that this morality is rather very loose, the one that makes concessions to maintain longevity. It had been also thus recognized by other Indian ascetics, who even despised it for this reason.

That Buddhist morality was considered to be very loose in ancient India is clear even from Buddhist scriptures themselves. At one place ([Vinaya Pitaka,] Mahavagga I. 6, 10), where it is recounted how the Buddha, after his Enlightenment, met again his companions who had been accompanying him during his ascetic self–mortification, so these ascetics, when seeing Gautama, agree on the following: “Brothers, see how shramana Gautama, coming here, is fat after he has renounced self-mortification and has indulged in abundance. It is thus not necessary to greet him by standing up, it is not necessary to receive his bowl and coat, it is not necessary to lay down a mat. He will sit down if he wants to.”

But even for the people in India, this morality was too rigorous, so that from the first days the adherents (upasakas) were obliged to follow only the first five prohibitions, while the third one was modified as noted above.

But this morality became too strict even for the order itself, when the original fervour had ceased and an easy life, rather than means to attain the bliss of nirvana, had been sought in the order. Moreover, the morality became difficult at the time when bhikshus began to be reckoned as priests. And it happened that this morality became mere formality, which can be outsmarted. The negativity of Buddhist morality was a fertile soil for these cunning interpretations. That is why, instead of morality, there is in Buddhist countries a state which I would call – I believe quite correctly – Jesuitism. The morality which was originally formulated very accurately has been completely turned upside down by casuistry. I will present just one, but typical, example. The last prohibition of the ten commandments of Buddhism forbids monks to use any money. The commentary on the place in canonical scriptures of Buddhism where this prohibition of money-usage is formulated says that a touch of money pollutes a beggar monk. Contemporary custom is based on this ground: a monk is not allowed to touch money, but he can quite easily carry it in a wallet or covered by a scarf; only when making a transaction a monk cannot touch the money, and the seller has to take a precise amount out by himself. How was this originally surely noble morality bent can best be seen in Ceylonese Buddhist monasteries, where Europeans are being very rudely extorted for money for being shown historical landmarks, and a visitor cannot win favour with any amount of money, only if he reminds bhikshus the original morality – as I used to do during my stay in Ceylon – by giving them a handful of rice instead of gratuity; but the rice has to be always carried for this reason. – Manners among the people who are not bound even by the five precepts are even worse. Sinhalese Buddhists were actually – next to Tibetans in Sikkim – the worst people I have encountered during my travels: treacherous, liars, alcoholics, thieves – this is probably the most moderate characteristic of a Sinhalese.

Thus, this is the condition of Buddhist morality today, and I doubt that there is anyone in Europe who would be in temptation to follow it. Of course, all the Europeans who have become Buddhist monks because of ideas seek the original morality, the morality which – I would say – is only bookish.

But even in this ideal form, the Buddhist morality cannot satisfy a modern man, because, in general, it does not stand above modern compulsory legislation and above mere decency. The Buddhist morality respects the will of an individual only once, when it allows monks, bound by rules, to leave the order at any time, and it does not force by any means its adherents to obey its rules. But in this morality, there is nowhere any trace of a cultivation of the will, which alone can present a moral rescue for modern man. Every position provokes its opposition, and that is why moral imperatives, since times immemorial, cause difficulties; if they are not accompanied by a penal code, they become completely illusionary. This is the reason for contemporary degeneration and miserable condition of originally good Buddhist morality, which can be seen not only in the south but in the north as well, where – e.g. in Tibet – it turns completely into a tyranny of priests–lamas.

I believe that, in today’s conditions, a modern European man with higher education and some culture – and it is those who resort to Buddhism – does not need to seek a guideline for one’s life and behaviour in the Far East, nor outside oneself in one’s immediate surroundings. The will of an individual is the only real authority for the very same individual. If the will is to be in harmony with the will of other individuals, it is not necessary to construct exorbitant imperatives, but just a few and very simple utilitarian and egoistic combinations – or what is usually called decency.

I believe that what is presented here in this outline is an objective and impartial assessment of Buddhism. My personal opinion concerning Buddhism as both a religious system and a morality is somewhat sterner, since I do not accept these categories at all, because they both constrain the natural development of an individual, while religion does so on the level of thought, and morality on the level of life’s animalistic nature. –

[fn1] Several works on Buddhism have been written. From those accessible to the general public who can read German, I can recommend two small volumes of Sammlung Göschen by Prof. D. E. Hardy: no. 83 Indische Religionsgeschichte and no. 174 Buddha.

[HARDY, Edmund Georg Nicolaus: Indische Religionsgeschichte, Sammlung Göschen 83, Leipzig: G.J. Göschen’sche Verlagshandlung, 1904, and Buddha, Sammlung Göschen 174, Leipzig: G.J. Göschen’sche Verlagshandlung, 1903. The “D.” is probably a typo for “Dr.” since the author’s name in both volumes is “Prof. Dr. Edmund Hardy”, translator’s note]

1. Otakar Pertold (1884–1965) is considered to be the founder of the Czech academic science of religion, orientalist, and ethnographer, with a special focus on Indian religions (mainly Jainism) and theory in the science of religions. He studied Asian languages (Sanskrit, Pali, Hindi, Tamil, and Sinhalese) under one of the first Czech orientalists and a Sanskrit scholar Josef Zubatý (1855–1931). In 1909–1910, Pertold made his first trip to southern India and Ceylon, where he then returned regularly. In the years 1920–1923, he held a diplomatic post as the consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Mumbai. In 1927, he was appointed associate professor in the Comparative Science of Religion, an event which was followed by the establishment of the first Czech non-confessional institute for the study of religion, called Seminar for the Comparative Science of Religion at Charles university, Prague. In 1934, Pertold was appointed to a full professorship. After the Second World War and the establishment of the socialist regime, the Seminar was dissolved and its courses cancelled, but Pertold managed to keep the study of religions at the newly established Department of national ethnography and history of religion, which was chaired by him; the department, due to political circumstances, changed its name to Department of prehistory and national ethnography and later to the Department of national ethnography. During this time, Pertold claimed his favour to Marxism, which was probably the reason for his remaining in the academia. But even before, Pertold shared anticlerical and free-thinking ideas, and it is no surprise, thus, that in the 1950s his ideas carried a distinguishable mark of dialectical materialism, a leading idea of Marxism and the only officially state–approved theoretical framework for any research of religion in the Czech lands up to the change of regimes in 1989. His anticlericalism and antipathy towards superstition are both present in the translated article, which also contains many commonplace ideas concerning Buddhism of the time.
2. An English translation of this passage makes it lose its point. The Czech word for religion (náboženství) etymologically implies the importance of the concept “god” (“bůh” in Czech). This etymological definition is, according to Pertold, very narrow, because it ignores other forms of religion, e.g. those on the primal stage of development (see the following note). Because of its denial of god, Buddhism is not, according to Pertold, a religion (náboženství), but religio. By the latter term, Pertold means religion as a universal category comprising all systems he considers to be religious. A key to determine which system is religious is, for him, a concept of feeling of dependency on something that transcends humans, accompanied by a need to influence that something by cultic behaviour (again, see the following note; for references see “Related literature” below).
3. Pertold classifies religion into three classes: primal, secondary, and tertiary. Primal religions originate from humans’ direct observation of the world, which triggers the feeling of dependency on phenomena transcending epistemic capacities of humans at the particular stage of cultural development. Moreover, humans tend to influence the root of the dependency by various behaviour, e.g. ritual. Primal religions are, for example, animism, fetishism, manism, and natural mythological religions. Secondary religions are based on subsequent elaborations of reflexive thinking about the nature of the root of dependency. Thus, anthropomorphism and the idea of deities are formulated. In addition, humans start to ponder about existential questions, such as the shortness of life, the nature of the afterlife, and the distribution of merits and demerits among humans. Moreover, closer observation of nature and its laws led humans to think about causality ruling natural phenomena, in a way that they, gradually or by revolution, conceive an idea of one necessary cause and reason of all worldly happenings. Thus, theism emerges. Secondary religions, furthermore, strongly emphasise morality as a means for good life. Therefore, morality is, in Pertold’s view, an integral part of theism and develops together with it. Examples of secondary religions are Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Brahmanism (outcomes of the gradual development of religion), and Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam (results of the revolution). Finally, tertiary religions represent degeneration of the natural development of the worldview. Secondary religions, by their rational aspect, tended towards scientific thinking, which, in Pertold’s view, is supposed to replace religion. But, as such, these religions are intelligible only to elites, not to common people. These commoners continue their cultic behaviour, but mix the theistic worldview with ideas from primal religions, so religions based on wrong judgements, sophisms, and incorrect inductions emerge. Moreover, these tertiary religions can be mixed with science as well. The result of this development – or rather degeneration – of religion is both superstition (if not systematised) and folk religion and medicine (if systematised). (References are to be found in “Related literature” below.)
4. Neobuddhism is a designation for modern European and American receptions of Buddhism, and as such, it does not represent a unified school or teachings. Nevertheless, some common aspects can be found among modern western sympathisers of Buddhism, such as criticism of a Christian worldview, including its concept of God, emphasis on individual morality and social justice, and inclinations to hermetism (predominantly to the Theosophic Society). Apart from philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), other thinkers can be mentioned, such as Paul Carus (1852–1919), Paul Dahlke (1865–1928), co-founder of the Theosophic Society Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), and poet Edwin Arnold (1832–1904); among Czech Buddhist–minded authors we find Leopold Procházka (1879–1944), Rudolf Máša (1880–1954), or writers Julius Zeyer (1841–1901) and Jaroslav Vrchlický (1853–1912).

• Pertold, Otakar: Úvod do studia náboženství [Introduction to the Study of Religion], Prague: Vilímek, 1918.
• Pertold, Otakar: Základy všeobecné vědy náboženské [Foundations of the General Science of Religion], Kladno: J. Šnajdr, 1920.
• Pertold, Otakar: Džinismus [Jainism], Prague: SPN, 1966.